I don't know much about Russia's nuclear capabilities, but are all nuke's created equal? Seems like this argument relies on Russia having nuke's that will work/hit targets/not be shot down. I've heard that Russia's army, while large, is also old and out of date. Shouldn't theory of deterrence and MAD be adjusted to nuclear arsenal's that are functional and equivalent to the opponent's arsenal?
This is hilarious and a little scary. And it speaks to one of the critiques of MAD and Game Theory that it tends to rely on assumptions of rationality or partial rationality. The more unhinged he actually is the more it complicates the possible outcomes/responses.
nm, wrote that comment before you covered this...maybe would add that this factor and factor of political pressure could go hand-in-hand. Sam Harris brought up something like this with the hypothetical q ~ 'what's the response when someone launches nukes that fizzle?"
Ya, this seems to be the case. At least going off this and other OSINT accounts. It doesn't seem surprising, and it may mean that Russia/other actors just simply don't have the deterrence leverage that we expect. That said, it doesn't seem to be emboldening Ukraine or the West, unless the recent incursions into Kursk is in light of these developments (personally, I doubt it). I also wonder if there are parallels in the calculus of other western countries like Israel, who seems like they've resisted going after Iranian nuclear facilities in any overt way during this current war. Maybe they just understand it's less important given their actual functioning than we're led to believe.?
Still, it's a really good point. So much could go wrong with Russia's nuclear arsenal: it's deteriorated with age/won't launch, it launches but fizzles/it's a dud, it launches but misses, it launches but it's a "small punch." All these outcomes would really upset the balance of things. Think about the "launches but misses" scenario (the nuke lands on a small village near Kyiv). It would publicly signal that Russia has uncontrollable nukes. How would opponent respond? Would neighbors just start grabbing Russian turf? Or would it strike more fear?
Definitely. And regarding grabbing turf; and assuming rationality and intent of Russia to grab and annex Ukraine (stated goal)...the question of whether to/not to nuke prob has to consider how much of the territory you want to lay waste too?, increase in the restiveness of the opponent population?, etc. (even if unsuccessful or no response/"fizzle").
I don't know much about Russia's nuclear capabilities, but are all nuke's created equal? Seems like this argument relies on Russia having nuke's that will work/hit targets/not be shot down. I've heard that Russia's army, while large, is also old and out of date. Shouldn't theory of deterrence and MAD be adjusted to nuclear arsenal's that are functional and equivalent to the opponent's arsenal?
Adam: The story gets even more weird - allegedly, Putin consulted shamans about using nukes: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-met-with-shamans-in-mongolia-to-ask-about-using-nukes/ar-AA1rGUrF?ocid=entnewsntp&pc=U531&cvid=fd8599f7f4bf4e94a3e635b73060ef4b&ei=19
This is hilarious and a little scary. And it speaks to one of the critiques of MAD and Game Theory that it tends to rely on assumptions of rationality or partial rationality. The more unhinged he actually is the more it complicates the possible outcomes/responses.
nm, wrote that comment before you covered this...maybe would add that this factor and factor of political pressure could go hand-in-hand. Sam Harris brought up something like this with the hypothetical q ~ 'what's the response when someone launches nukes that fizzle?"
Hi, Adam: It turns out that hypothesis 1 in the podcast (technical failure) might be a real part of the story: https://twitter.com/MeNMyRC1/status/1837611953734537377
Multiple times, the Russian state it seems can't fire the weapon.
Ya, this seems to be the case. At least going off this and other OSINT accounts. It doesn't seem surprising, and it may mean that Russia/other actors just simply don't have the deterrence leverage that we expect. That said, it doesn't seem to be emboldening Ukraine or the West, unless the recent incursions into Kursk is in light of these developments (personally, I doubt it). I also wonder if there are parallels in the calculus of other western countries like Israel, who seems like they've resisted going after Iranian nuclear facilities in any overt way during this current war. Maybe they just understand it's less important given their actual functioning than we're led to believe.?
Still, it's a really good point. So much could go wrong with Russia's nuclear arsenal: it's deteriorated with age/won't launch, it launches but fizzles/it's a dud, it launches but misses, it launches but it's a "small punch." All these outcomes would really upset the balance of things. Think about the "launches but misses" scenario (the nuke lands on a small village near Kyiv). It would publicly signal that Russia has uncontrollable nukes. How would opponent respond? Would neighbors just start grabbing Russian turf? Or would it strike more fear?
Definitely. And regarding grabbing turf; and assuming rationality and intent of Russia to grab and annex Ukraine (stated goal)...the question of whether to/not to nuke prob has to consider how much of the territory you want to lay waste too?, increase in the restiveness of the opponent population?, etc. (even if unsuccessful or no response/"fizzle").